Newsweek‘s Michael Hirsh rose to Fed chair Ben Bernanke’s defense this week. Addressing criticism of Bernanke from various quarters, Hirsh asks “if any of this reflects a fair assessment of the man and his tenure? The answer: not even close.”

With that opening, I expected Hirsh to debunk Bernanke’s critics, who include p3 author Dean Baker. But when Hirsh turns to Dean’s specific points, he acknowledges their validity. Dean noted that Bernanke “felt that the Fed should not concern itself with asset bubbles, or call the attention of financial markets or the public to these bubbles by using its regulatory power to rein in lending, or explicitly using interest rates to target a bubble.” Here’s Hirsh, in Bernanke’s defense:

Actually that’s not quite true; the paper with which Bernanke made his name in Washington, published in 1999 with his coauthor Mark Gertler, did argue against a strategy of using interest rates to deflate asset prices. But the paper defended the Fed’s use of other tools like regulation, especially in markets in which there was high leverage (which was not a major problem during the tech bubble Bernanke and Gertler were addressing). And in July 2008—though it was far too late to make a difference in the subprime scandal—Bernanke announced a new “Regulation Z,” which finally created some common-sense lending rules such as forbidding mortgages without sufficient documentation.

So let me get this straight. Did Bernanke use his power at the Fed to prevent or even call attention to the housing bubble before it ruined the economy? No.

Moving on, Hirsh addresses Dean’s point that Bernanke failed to get anything from the banks when the Fed began shoveling money in their direction. According to Hirsh, this “typical lament” also misses the mark. Because it’s inaccurate? No. Hirsh concedes that “we could have and probably should have” demanded restrictions on the banks in return for the cash. But the blame, Hirsh claims, should go to Treasury and Congress. Evidently it’s too much to ask the Federal Reserve, whose specific purpose is to regulate the banks, to take responsibility for a bank-fueled disaster.

Unable to refute Dean’s points, but having done his best to confuse the issue, Hirsh returns to his original thesis and adds some Biblical imagery. It seems clear, he concludes, that “what’s going on right now is more of a legislative cruci-’fiction’—with an emphasis on the fiction.” OK, got it. Bernanke is dying for our sins.

Sorry, Mr. Hirsh. Not even close. If you actually want to understand Bernanke’s role in all of this, be sure to read Dean’s forthcoming book, False Profits: Recovering from the Bubble Economy.